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THE INNOVATION OF HARRY'S RAZORS: HOW THE FTC IS INFLUENCING VENTURE CAPITALBACKED STARTUPS

Sean J. Linehan*
INTRODUCTION

Venture capital fuels disruption and rewards consumers. Startups funded by venture capital
have boomed in recent years, as they have introduced numerous innovative products and services
to transform stale industries.1 Resulting from startups' success, consumers have received tangible
benefits in the form of lower prices, higher quality, and more choices.2 On February 2, 2020, the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") turned heads with a decision that seemingly
halted venture-backed momentum and its accompanying consumer benefits.3 In its decision, the
FTC blocked a proposed $1.37 billion merger between Harry's, Inc. ("Harry's") and Edgewell
Personal Care Company ("Edgewell"). In familiar pro-competition language, the FTC explained
how Harry's needed to maintain its position in the personal care industry as an independent
&

disrupter to the two dominant wet shave razor suppliers: Gillette, backed by its parent Procter

Gamble ("P&G"), and Schick, backed by its parent Edgewell.4 In turn, the Commission reasoned

* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1Between 2010 and the end of 2019, venture-backed startups raised more than $730 billion, almost doubling the $400
billion raised in the previous decade. See Jeffrey Grabow, 2019 finishes as second strongest VC investment year on
record, EY (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.ey.com/enus/growth/2019-finishes-as-second-strongest-vc-investmentyear-on-record. See also Thales S. Teixeira, DisruptionStarts with Unhappy Customers, Not Technology, HARVARD
BUSINESS REVIEW (Jun. 6, 2019) (describing how consumers are at the heart of startup disruption).
2 Complaint,

In re Edgewell PersonalCare Products, No. 9390 (FTC Feb. 2, 2020).

3 Denise Power, MergerMeltdown: Ill-Fated Harry'sDealA HarbingerofInvesting Reset, FORBES

(Feb. 14, 2020),
https: //www.forbes. com/sites/denisepower/2020/02/ 14/merger-meltdown-ill-fated-hariys-deal-a-harbinger-ofinvesting-reset/?sh=5dd453266852 (discussing widespread disappointment and confusion by the regulatory
opposition to the Edgewell-Harry's merger).
4

Complaint, supra note 2.

that the proposed merger would hurt consumers because if consummated, the merger would
reverse the price decreases caused by Harry's entry into the wet shaving market.5
The Commission's decision was unique in its emphasis on Harry's successful leap from a
direct-to-consumer model to brick-and-mortar retail. As some have noted, Harry's apparent sin
was competing too well against the razor giant Gillette. 6 While the Commission held that the
agreement was presumptively illegal, this article primarily posits that the Commissioners
underappreciated the necessity of innovation and thereby misjudged the pro-competitive benefits
offered to rebut that presumption of illegality.
Part I of this article will evaluate the FTC decision thoroughly, paying close attention to
each segment of the FTC's reasoning. Part II will contend that the Commission's decision in fact
harms consumers in the long run, namely by stifling innovation. Consumers not only hope for
lower prices in the relevant market; they are also drawn to revitalized products characterized by
new designs and creative marketing. By blocking a valid exit strategy for a successful startup, the
FTC will subsequently discourage similarly situated startups from moving to brick-and-mortar
retail. Part III of this article will assess how the decision reflects the evolving role of the
Commission. In light of how the FTC has recently captured headlines with its role against Big
Tech monopolization, this blocked merger demonstrates the FTC's new vision of curtailing early

5Id.

Tom Foster, The Founders of Harry'sGot a $1.37 Billion Offer to Sell. But the FTC Wasn't Sold, INC. MAGAZINE
(2020),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/202102/tom-foster/harrys-jeff-raider-andy-katz-mayfield-edgewell-failedacquisition-deal.html.
6

2

acquisitions.' Quite possibly, the Commission is learning from its mistake of allowing Big Tech's
unfettered acquisitions of nascent competitors.8
I. FTC DECISION TO BLOCK MERGER
A. The ProposedAcquisition
The personal care industry was abuzz in early 2020, as consumer advocates and the shaving
market anxiously awaited an FTC ruling on the merger proposed by Edgewell and Harry's.9 Jeff
Raider and Andy Katz-Mayfield, the co-founders of Harry's, are pioneers in the startup world,
meaning that the decision dealt to Harry's would surely influence how future entrepreneurs
navigated established industries. 0
Antitrust violations aside, the proposed merger would have been mutually beneficial for
both parties involved. Edgewell was the number two manufacturer of wet shave razors and the
dominant supplier of private label razors in the U.S." Harry's launched in 2013 as an online-only
direct-to-consumer men's system razor subscription service." Following its online success,
Harry's crossed into brick-and-mortar retail in 2016.13 As a company funded by venture capital,

'

FED TRADE COMM'N, FTC FILES SUIT TO BLOCK EDGEWELL PERSONAL CARE COMPANY'S ACQUISITION OF

HARRY'S, INC. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-files-suit-block-edgewellpersonal-care-companys-acquisition;
see
Cases
and
Proceedings,
FTC
v.
Facebook,
Inc.
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/191-0134/facebook-inc-ftc-v
(alleging
long
course
of
anticompetitive conduct).
8 Lauren

Feiner, Facebook drops on report FTC is looking at Instagram, WhatsApp acquisitions in antitrust
probe,
CNBC (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/01/ftc-reportedly-scrutinizing-facebooks-purchase-ofinstagram-whatsapp.html
9 Power, supra note 3. (noting the buildup surrounding the eventual FTC decision).
10 David Gelles, Jeff Raider on Founding Warby Parker and Harry's, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/business/jeff-raider-warby-parker-harrys-corner-office.html

" Complaint, supra note 2 at para. 35.
1

Id. at para. 36.

13

Id

Harry's naturally sought an exit strategy to reward its investors.14 In short, exit strategies typically
come in the form of either an initial public offering or a buyout." Harry's decided against going
public and found the perfect buyer in Edgewell, which offered $1.37 billion in stock and cash to
buy Harry's.16 Harry's was falling short in capital, and the money from Edgewell would help it
scale." On February 2, 2020, the FTC filed to block the merger.1 8 After deliberation, both
Edgewell and Harry's accepted the disappointing decision, declining to contest. 19
The Commission issued its complaint due to its belief that Harry's and Edgewell had
executed a merger agreement in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which if consummated
would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act as well as Section 5 of the FTC Act. 20 In step-by-step
analysis, the Commission defined the relevant market, declared the Proposed Acquisition
presumptively illegal, highlighted the anticompetitive effects that would result from the
consummated merger, and concluded that no pro-competitive benefits existed to rebut the
presumption of illegality. 2 1

" Foster, supra note 6.
15

Ronen Menipaz, Exit strategiesfor venture capitalfunds - a peek behind the scenes, M51 (Jan. 13,
2020),

https://m51. co/blog/exit-strategies-for-venture-capital-funds-a-peek-behind-the-scenes/.
16

Foster, supra note 6.

17

Id.

18 Complaint, supra note 2.

Allstair Gray, Harry's threatens legal action after Edgewell scraps $1.4bn deal, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/1099b768-4c12-1lea-95a0-43d18ec715f5
(analyzing Harry's consideration of legal
action).
19

20

Complaint, supra note 2.

21

Id.

4

B. GoverningAntitrust Laws
The Commission issued its administrative order with alleged violations of Section 5 of the
FTC Act and if the merger was consummated, Section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 2 Specifically, Section
5 of the FTC Act declares that unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are unlawful. 23 Under the Clayton Act, an
acquisition is illegal if the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition, or
tend to create a monopoly. 24
C. The Commission'sReasoning
The FTC analyzed the Proposed Acquisition in close detail and concluded that Harry's and
Edgewell could not overcome the agreement's presumptive illegality. 25 First, the FTC defined the
relevant market for the Proposed Acquisition as no broader than the manufacture and sale of wet
shave system razors and disposable razors ("wet shave razors") sold in the United States. 26 The
FTC opined that the Proposed Acquisition would have increased concentration in the already
highly concentrated market for wet shave razors, as well as within narrower relevant markets. 27
Under the quantitative Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), the Proposed Acquisition was
presumptively illegal. 28 Numerically, the market for the manufacture and sale of wet shave razors
in the United States was already highly concentrated, with an HHI of over 3,000.29 The Proposed

22

Id. at para. 80-82.

23

15 U.S.C. § 45.

24

15 U.S.C. § 18.

25

Complaint, supra note 2.

26

Id. at para. 21-22.

27 Id. at para. 41.
28

1Id. at para. 42.

29

Id. at para. 43.
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Acquisition would have increased that concentration by more than 200 points and was therefore
presumptively illegal. 30
The Commission largely focused on Harry's entry into Target and Walmart because
Harry's retail prices were roughly $10 cheaper than P&G's Gillette and Edgewell's Schick five
blade products, which therefore forced both companies to make a decision on whether to lower
their prices.31 In its clearest conclusion, the FTC declared the Proposed Acquisition to be
anticompetitive because it would eliminate the growing competition between Harry's and
Edgewell that had thus far been highly beneficial to consumers.3 2 The FTC explained that as a
result of that head-to-head competition, consumers today enjoy lower prices on many different
types of wet shave razors, and have a broader selection of razors at value price points.33
In its analysis of the pro-competitive benefits of the merger, the Commission
predominantly focused on the fact that new entry into the shaving market was increasingly
difficult, with several barriers to entry.34 The Commission reasoned that Harry's had been fortunate
with its timing. The wet shaving market was open to disruption at the time of Harry's origin, and
the internet allowed for Harry's to compete.35 The ways in which Gillette and Schick responded
to Harry's encroachment into the relevant market demonstrated the viable options for how a
leading company could react to a nascent competitor. Gillette opted to lower prices to compete
with Harry's. 36 Schick kept prices stable, but at the same time, began to consider an acquisition of

30
31
32

33

Id.
d. at para. 54.

Id. at para
Id.

65.

34

at para. 73.

35

Id. at para. 72.

36

Id. at para. 56.

1Id.

6

Harry's. 37 The FTC positively noted that both strategies were evidence of the disruption Harry's
was bringing to an entrenched market. 38 Because the Commission wanted such price disruption to
continue, it blocked this merger on the basis of a price-centric economic prediction. 39 However,
Harry's gained fast popularity with consumers for a host of other reasons, especially its creativity
and hip corporate style.40
Among other findings, the FTC boldly concluded that Harry's products were likely to
expand into additional retailers in the near future regardless of whether Harry's was acquired by
Edgewell. 4 1 This conclusory statement treated the complex question of Harry's growing market
share as something that was inevitable. Very few wet shave companies are able to get their
products on the shelves to compete with established players such as Gillette and Schick. 42 The
FTC admitted that Harry's ability to reach the shelves was an impressive feat. 43 For several
reasons, the Commission diminished the difficulty of expanding into additional retailers and
regarded Harry's as an established corporation when it was in fact still a venture-capital backed
startup in desperate need of capital. 44 It was speculative at best for the FTC to claim that Harry's

37

Id. at para. 63.

38

Id.

39

Id.

See generally HARRY'S, https://www.harrys.com/en/us (last visited Mar. 4, 2021); Sharon Terlep & Khadeeja
Safdar, Online Upstart Harry's Razor Jumps Into Gillette's Turf THE WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/online-upstart-harrys-razor-jumps-into-gillettes-turf-1478707250
(discussing
the
reasons why Harry's is so popular).
4

41

Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 46-47.

42 Id.; see also Baker Hostetler, FTC Says Razor Thin Market Share Not Enoughfor Merger Clearanceand What It
Means for Disruptive DTC Brands, JD SUPRA, (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-says-razorthin-market-share-not-25348/.
13

Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 77.

Foster, supra note 6. Harry's has been a scrappy competitor and still branded itself as a hip moniker in downtown
New York City. Despite its success, the company has remained true its initial relaxed culture and disruptive attitude.
44

7

products would likely expand into additional retailers, and soon for that matter, regardless of
whether the company was acquired by Edgewell.
Internal documents and public statements are often the most compelling evidence
available to the antitrustagencies because they offer a viewpoint that regulators feel is unvarnished
from the parties' advocacy efforts. 45 The Edgewell-Harry's complaint included many references
to both internal documents and public statements to investors. 46 The FTC alleged that Edgewell
and P&G had publicly recognized that the Proposed Acquisition was likely to benefit themselves
rather than consumers, citing statements from Edgewell and P&G quarterly earnings calls. 47
Specifically, the complaint referenced a quote from Edgewell's CEO that Edgewell was not
interested in "lead[ing] a new round . .. of value destruction," which the FTC contended was proof
that Edgewell was not interested in price competition or lowering prices.48
Harry's, on the other hand, possessed no such internal communications. 49 Often, internal
communications are overtly probative forms of evidence, whereby competitors admit ambitious
plans to squash competition on a quest for personal glory; Bill Gates, for example, likely wishes
he had been more reserved in his internal communications. 50 In the context of this Proposed

C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1880-81 (2020); see also David A.
Higbee, EDGEWELL/HARRY'S: WHEN A MAVERICK IS MORE THAN ITS MARKET SHARE, TH EM&A LAWYER
(Mar. 2020, Vol. 24, Issue 3), https://www.sheannan.com/-/media/Files/Perspectives/2020/04/Edgewell-HarrysWhen-a-Maverick-is-More-Than-Its-MarketShare.pdf?la=en&hash=D 17E1AA39AAFBDE63E23FF0954B83E3E9F7F4E40
45

46

Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 13.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49 See generally Complaint, supra note 2 (mentioning no internal communications from Harry's that the company was

seeking to harm consumers in any way; instead the goal was to provide more of its products).

5 See contra Memorandum from Bill Gates, Chairman and CEO of Microsoft Corp., to Exec. Staff and Direct
Reports, Microsoft Corp. (May 26, 1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2006/03/03/20.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8CX-ZDFQ]; see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (en banc) (per curiam).

8

Agreement, however, Harry's did not possess any such thirst for power or domination. In fact,
many of the long-time team members were not excited about the new deal, believing that hitching
Harry's to a company such as Edgewell was sacrificing the sex appeal that Harry's diffused to its

consumers. 51
Harry's found itself gravitating towards Edgewell out of need. After all, Harry's was a
startup. Edgewell began flirting with Harry's toward the end of 2018.52 Each had something the
other needed.53 Even as Harry's stockpiled cash for mergers & acquisitions purposes, it had the
operational resources of a much smaller company.54 An urgent problem was approaching: Harry's
was reaching the limits of its razor technology and manufacturing capacity.5 5 The business of
making sharp and durable blades at scale, as Harry's discovered, is complicated and expensive.

56

Although Harry's owned a factory in Germany, Edgewell had decades of experience with more
capacity and would be able to swiftly double Harry's output.5 7 In the end, Harry's did not set out
to destroy and conquer; it was a startup seeking an exit and the ability to continue making novel
products.58

51

Foster, supra note 6.

52

Id.

53 Id.
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

5 Foster, supra note 6.
58

Power, supra note 3.
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II. HARMFUL EFFECTS TO CONSUMERS

A. Consumers Want CreativeProducts
Harry's should not be faulted for its accomplishments because the harms of any business
setback will ultimately flow to consumers. Brick-and-mortar retail stores historically have been
the most common location where consumers purchase goods, especially personal care products.5 9
By gaining entry into such a pivotal marketplace, Harry's finally placed its products directly in
front of consumers' eyes. 60 Not only did this step propel Harry's in the sense of its own financial
success, but its corporate leap also directly helped consumers. Recent studies show that only onethird of consumer purchases are pre-meditated. 6 1 This simple statistic is the reason why marketing
and in-store placement strategies can be so crucial to a company's success; many consumers are
convinced to buy a product when perusing items in a retail store. 62 This social phenomenon aligns
with the relevant antitrust laws.
Judge Richard Posner perfectly articulated the ultimate issue in reviewing a merger under
the antitrust laws: whether the challenged acquisition is likely to hurt consumers, as by making it
easier for the firm to collude expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther above
the competitive level. 63 In this sense, the FTC misplaced its attention on price alone and should
have considered consumer satisfaction as the threshold issue. 64

9 4imprint Blue Papers, Product Placement, https://info.4imprint.com/wp-content/uploads/1P-02-0112-Jan-BluePaper-Product-Placement.pdf (last accessed Mar. 5, 2021).
60

61

Id.

Id.

Jane Haffer, Changing Consumer Preferences on the Digital Shelf, GARTNER (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.gartner. com/en/marketing/insights/daily-insights/changing-consumer-preferences-on-the-digital-shelf;
see also 4imprint, supra note 59.
62

Andrew R. Dick, CoordinatedInteraction: Pre-merger Constraintsand Post-mergerEffects, 12 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 65, 65-66 (2003) (describing Judge Posner's interpretation of the antitrust laws); see also Hosp. Corp. ofAm. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986).
63

64

Dick, supra note 63, at 82.

10

Millennials in the U.S. are aging, and market research demonstrates that these younger
generations have a massive impact on the country's care and beauty care industry. 65 Younger
generations tend to spend a significant amount of time on the skincare, color cosmetics, and other
personal care products, with one reason being the maintenance of an attractive social media
presence. 66 If Harry's growth is curtailed, products will inevitably be stalled and innovation cut
short. 67 Consumers will be less likely to engage with new brands because they will have less
exposure to them and will predominantly be offered P&G products in Walmart and Target, which
is the way it is has been for some time. 68 The massive growth in millennial interest in personal
care products demands a close attention to whether a merger will actually satisfy consumers. In
this case, the Commission should have focused more on the paramount desire of consumers to see
Harry's on shelves, rather than the short-term price decreases. The FTC decision, in this way, is
ripe with irony. The blocked merger is delivered as a mission to help consumers while it in fact
hurts the very company from which consumers want to buy products.
B. Brick-and-Mortar:Disincentivized
By way of its decision, the Commission will influence the lifecycle of a startup, which will
in turn hurt consumers. The outcome against Harry's will cause startups that require an exit
strategy in order to reward their venture capitalist investors to inevitably forego brick-and-

Grand View Research, U.S. Personal Care Products Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Product
(Skincare, Haircare,PersonalHygiene, Make-up, Fragrances, OralHygiene), CompetitiveLandscape, And Segment
Forecasts, 2018 - 2025 (Jan. 2018), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/us-personal-careproducts-market (analyzing trends in millennial preferences).
65

66

Id.

Heath, Harry's shows it's not the biggest marketing budgets
https://www.canva.comlearn/harrys-shows-its-not-the-biggest-marketing-budgets-that-win/.
67

68

Catherine

d.
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that

win,
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mortar. 69 Though the FTC intends for companies such as Harry's to remain independent disrupters
to stagnant industries, that intention warps the goal of many startups.7 0 Not all entrepreneurs who
create innovative products long to reach the gargantuan stature of an Edgewell or a P&G. 7 1 Often,
startups develop due to an observable problem and an idea that will solve that problem.72 As the
idea starts small, venture capitalists help propel the startup forward and bring the solution to more
consumers.

3

Harry's may have the stamina to continue acting as the independent disrupter in the

way the FTC hopes, but as a startup, its hurdles with raising capital may subdue its growth.74
Instead of a surge in long-term independent disruption, the Commission's decision will likely
cause other startups to seek acquisition earlier in their business's lifecycle where the competitive
risk is lower: before they reach brick-and-mortar.7 5 In essence, the more nascent a company is, the
less likely that company is to truly compete with the incumbents in the industry.76
Following this sequence, the ultimate losers in this scenario are not the emerging
competitors or the large acquiring firms. The losers are the consumers. These consumers want
readily available choices in Target and Walmart and are drawn to creative products. 77 Harry's was
on the cusp of offering even more products in the retail personal care space to the satisfaction of

69

Christine Hall, Analysis: P&G's FailedBillie Deal Could Have Chilling Effect On Consumer StartupAcquisitions,

CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Feb. 3, 2021).
70

Laura Forman & Justin Lahart, Mutually Assured Disruption in Silicon Valley, THE WALL ST. J. (July 5,
2019),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/mutually-assured-disruption-in-silicon-valley-11562319004.
7

Id.

72 Id.
73 Id.
74

Foster, supra note 6.

75 Hall, supra note 69.
76 Id.

77 4imprint, supra note 59.
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consumers, but the Commission's decision has diverted them back to the drawing board. 78 In
accordance with this sentiment, Harry's responded to the Commission's decision with earnest
disappointment, stating that it believed strongly that the combined company would have delivered
exceptional brands and products at a great value and are still determined to bring those benefits to
consumers.79
In a brief point of comparison, when P&G achieved mammoth success with the
introduction of Tide cleaning products in 1946, the FTC chose not to pursue antitrust action. 80
Experts have analyzed the non-action and concluded that P&G at that time was simply a more
efficient firm that had legitimately earned its dominance. 81 P&G was accordingly entitled to the
good fortune earned by its superior management. 82 With breakthrough products, such as Tide and
Harry's razors, the Commission should consistently allow for consumers to enjoy these products
before stepping in to thwart those companies' growths.
C. Exit Strategies
In order to attract venture capital investors, startups must demonstrate a feasible way
toward a return on investors' capital and an exit from their company. 83 Exit strategies are about
money. The exit is the contingency plan for venture capitalists that gives them a return on their
investment. 84 Exit strategies take on different forms, but the two most prominent methods are

78

Heath, supra note 67.

79 Gray, supra note 19.
80

Robert L. Steiner, Management, market power and antitrust-Procter & Gamble and the U.S. laundry detergent

industry, 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 521, 567 (2013)
81

Id. at 566.

82

Id. at 567

83

Menipaz, supra note 15.

84

Id

13

mergers and acquisitions ("M&As" or "acquisition") and initial public offerings ("IPOs").85
Despite the fact that IPOs are surging, Harry's decided at the time of the proposed merger that the
acquisition method fit its needs. 86
Acquisition can serve as an important exit for investors in a small company, and thereby
attract capital necessary for innovation.87 Blocking or deterring too many acquisitions would be
undesirable.8 8 Conceding that the FTC's role in blocking mergers is essential in order to protect
consumers from overgrown companies dictating price, innovation is still equally essential to
consumer satisfaction. 89 Consumers are the ultimate benefactors of a protection on price increases,
as well as from the introduction of innovative products. If the Commission prevents an innovative
company such as Harry's from finding the capital it needs to continue to disrupt an industry, then
innovation will suffer. This possibility of deflated innovation is the long-term fear and most
devastating consequence of stalling Harry's.
Venture capital will continue despite any FTC decision, but experts are theorizing that
more acquisitions would begin to occur earlier in a startup's lifecycle where the competitive risk
is lower. 9 0 Regardless of which way companies adapt to the Commission's ruling, the focus still
must be directed back to consumers and the prices, innovation, and brick-and-mortar placement

85

1d.

Jason D. Rowley, Q4 Venture-Backed Exits See More Dollars, Fewer Deals, Crunchbase
(Jan. 8, 2019),
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/q4-venture-backed-exits-see-more-dollars-fewer-deals/; see also Matt Levine,
Money
Stuff
IPOs
Keep
Going
Up,
Bloomberg
Opinion
(Jan.
14,
2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-14/ipos-keep-going-up
86

87

Hemphill & Wu, supra note 45, at 1882.

88

Id. at 1881.

89

Id.

Brian Noridi, Early Stage VC Activity Isn't Slowing Down in 2021, BUILT IN (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://builtin.com/investments-exits/early-stage-funding-survey-2021?i=93500&utm_campaign=Built-InEmail&utm_source=transactional&utmmedium=email (providing that investment activity has either remained the
same or increased during the pandemic).
90

14

that will benefit them. Refraining from predicting the exact ways that startups funded by venture
capital will adapt, the rise in special purpose acquisition companies ("SPACs") demonstrates one
way in how quickly market players utilize new business strategies. 91
III. FUTURE ROLE OF THE FTC
Despite this article's focus on competition in the personal care industry, the antitrust
spotlight has shone brighter on Big Tech, as many consumers have likely noticed from the barrage
of news coverage. In fact, the emphasis on Big Tech likely influenced the decision against Harry's
and Edgewell because of the change in how the Commission is viewing its role. Following
Facebook's unchallenged acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, as well as Google acquiring
nascent competitors, the FTC has looked back at those deals with skepticism and regret.9 2 The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 ("Act") permits the government to review
certain mergers. 93 The Act was established to avoid some of the difficulties and expense that
enforcement agencies encounter when they challenge anticompetitive acquisitions after they have
occurred. 94 Prior review under the program enables the FTC to determine which acquisitions are
likely to be anticompetitive and to challenge them at a time when remedial action is most
effective. 95
Under the Act, the FTC should holistically analyze a nascent competitor before blocking
an acquisition. Raider and Katz-Mayfield profess that they started Harry's seven years ago with

91

Hall, supra note 69.

92

Id.

93 15 U.S.C. § 18a. The act amended the Clayton Act and requires companies to file premerger notifications with the
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department for certain acquisitions.
94

95

Id.
Id.

15

one simple premise: every man deserves a quality shave at a fair price. 96 While conceding the
company has grown quite a bit since its inception, the founders vow that this this guiding principle
has not changed. 97 In their own words, one of the fundamental goals of Harry's is lower prices for
consumers. Harry's continues to offer fairer prices, as evidenced by the higher prices of razor
alternatives. Harry's launched at Target with suggested retail prices several dollars below the most
comparable Schick and Gillette products. 98 Similarly, Harry's products on Target's website span
a simple, more affordable range between $5.99 and $15.99 while Gillette products run from $1.89
to $44.99.99
On a more granular level, consider the design comparison of Harry's to both Gillette and
Schick. Harry's offers its sleek razors in teal, bright blue, and orange colors. 100 Its shaving cream
bottles and accessories are fashioned with teal and silver and bright white lettering. 101 Of course,
the drawing of a playful woolly mammoth with protruding tusks marks all of Harry's bottles and
products. 102 Gillette and Schick, in contrast, are the same razors that consumers have seen on the
shelves at pharmacies and retail stores for years. Regardless of any design changes or new
packaging, the two companies are not new by nature of existing as a duopoly. The excitement of
purchasing Schick and Gillette is inevitably lower than that for purchasing Harry's. Consumers
are continually looking to replace bland purchases. 103

HARRY'S, supra note 40. Harry's website provides the goals of both co-founders and the company's mission
statement.
96

97

1d.

98

Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 5.

99 Terlep & Safdar, supra note 40.
100 HARRY'S,
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103
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The key for antitrust enforcement is to determine when a market displays dynamic
competition sufficient to warrant a different approach to enforcement. 104 That phenomenon arises
because "the stakes are higher:" innovation-particularly technological innovation is essential to
economic growth and social welfare. 105 Although an antitrust suit against an innovative company
may prevent abuse of market power, an erroneous decision will deny large consumer benefits. 106
Price alone does not determine choice. Products themselves are important determinants. In
addition to the slight price variances, it is equally likely that consumers flocked to Harry's for its
creative branding, no-frills products, and color schemes. 107
It is difficult to reconcile what is more attractive to consumer: lower prices or more
innovative products. However, the relevant wet shaving market was stagnant in both aspects. The
blocked acquisition bears comparison to Facebook's acquisition of Instagram, due to the way
consumers benefitted there. 108 In all, the optics of this FTC decision resemble the Commission's
trending perspective on Big Tech and lamentation of allowing for acquisition of their nascent
competitors. 109

Rachel S. Tennis & Alexander Baier Schwab, Business Model Innovation and Antitrust Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG.
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107 See HARRY'S, supra note 40 (describing the entire product line); see also Graham Winfrey, 3 Ways Harry's
RedesignedModern Shaving, INC. MAGAZINE (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.inc.com/graham-winfrey/3-ways-harrysredesigned-modern-shaving.html.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Relaxing antitrust enforcement in certain cases may enhance competition, spur innovation,
further efficiency, and eliminate some perverse asymmetries that occur in the current market.

10

Through its decision, the FTC essentially placed Harry's in a bind. By gaining the unprecedented
access into brick-and-mortar, Harry's was no longer able to grow as a company with the capital it
needed as a startup."' The Commission's decision to block the merger with Edgewell will not
change the overall nature of nascent competition.11 2 However, the lifecycle and acquisition process
will lead to less disrupters attempting to land in retail stores. Without widespread availability in
retail, consumers will suffer and resort to purchasing the same products in the existing stale
industries.1 1 3 Innovation is crucial to the success of venture capital supported startups, and the FTC
should encourage the progress of such startups. The Commission's apparent intention to make
amends for past mistakes with Big Tech's acquisitions of nascent competitors is misplaced in this
scenario. Harry's should have been permitted to continue prospering as a disrupter via the infusion
of capital and resources from Edgewell.
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